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GONZALES V. CARHART: BRINGING ABORTION
LAW BACK INTO THE FAMILY LAW FOLD
Helen M. Alvar*
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the first aspects of the Supreme Court's most recent
abortion case to attract commentary' was the majority opinion's
assertion of a "bond" between a woman and her unborn "child."2
The affirmation of this bond by the majority in Gonzales v. Car-
hart3 was a precursor to the Court's decision to uphold a federal
statute banning the performance of an abortion procedure in
which "the doctor extracts the fetus in a way conducive to pulling
out its entire body,"4 save the head, before "collapsing" or "crush-
ing" its skull 5 to "kill" the fetus.6 The statute at issue called the
banned procedure "partial-birth abortion"7 because the fetus is
mostly delivered from the woman at the time its existence is en-
ded. However, throughout the opinion the Court used the term
"intact dilation and extraction," or "intact D & E," one of several
terms employed by the medical community to identify what the
statute bans.8 The Gonzales opinion was further noted for its me-
ticulous descriptions of intact D & E and other abortion proce-
dures and language emphasizing the humanity and vulnerability
of fetal life.
Gonzales's concepts and language merit the attention they re-
ceived. Their like have not been seen in previous Supreme Court
abortion opinions. In fact, the Court's pre-Gonzales abortion opin-
ions were distinctly uncomfortable with language explicitly in-
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, Catholic University of America. The author would like to thank her husband and children
for the "gift of time" that made this article possible.
1. See e.g. Linda Greenhouse, In Reversal of Course, Justices, 5-4, Back Ban on Abor-
tion Method, N.Y. Times Al (Apr. 19, 2007); Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly
Influential Man in the Middle; Court's 5-4 Decisions Underscore His Power, Wash. Post Al
(May 13, 2007).
2. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007) ("Respect for life finds an ulti-
mate expression in the bond of love a mother has for her child.").
3. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
4. Id. at 1622 (internal citations omitted).
5. Id. at 1623 (internal citations omitted).
6. Id. (internal citations omitted).
7. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. 2004).
8. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1621 (internal citations omitted).
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cluding fetal life within the category of human life. The opinions
lack both internal consistency and consistency with each other in
their use of language about fetuses.9 Furthermore, rather than
seeing a bond between the woman and her fetus, prior opinions
see confrontation, with the state taking the fetus's side by restrict-
ing or even regulating abortion.10 Even in its two abortion opin-
ions most explicitly asserting the importance of gestating human
life-Webster v. Reproductive Health Services" and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey12-the Su-
preme Court did not perform the full bow toward fetal humanity
that it did in Gonzales. In Webster, for example, the Court spoke
merely about the state's interest in "protecting ... the potentiality
of human life"'13 and allowed states to decline to fund or provide
abortion services,' 4 and to mandate viability testing for fetuses at
twenty weeks or later in the gestation period.' 5 In Casey, the
Court referred to the "potential life" within the woman' 6 before
upholding provisions requiring informed consent, 17 a twenty-four-
hour waiting period,' 8 parental consent for minors requesting
abortions,' 9 and reporting requirements. 20 The Gonzales Court,
on the other hand, not only spoke of the fetus in terms usually
reserved for born life,2 ' but also allowed the state to entirely ban a
particular abortion procedure in the name of assisting women, the
medical profession, and "respect for life"22 in general.
The Gonzales decision also differs from prior abortion cases
because it appeared to adopt presumptions about parents and un-
born children that family law typically applies to relationships be-
tween parents and their born children. These include, first, the
presumption of a strong bond between a parent and his or her bio-
logical offspring, a bond that should be preserved whenever possi-
9. See infra pt. III.A (discussing language used in previous case law concerning abor-
tion).
10. Id.
11. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
12. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality).
13. Webster, 492 U.S. at 516.
14. Id. at 511.
15. Id. at 519-20.
16. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (plurality).
17. Id. at 885.
18. Id. at 887.
19. Id. at 899.
20. Id. at 900.
21. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007) (using terms such as "infant life").
22. Id.
Vol. 69410
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ble. 23 Second, family law presumes that children are naturally
vulnerable; parents have the primary right (and responsibility) to
protect them, but the state will intervene to either review or sup-
plant parental decisions whenever a child's welfare is seriously
endangered. 24 Gonzales, like many family law cases, apparently
relied on these presumptions in deference to their claimed self-
evident nature and in response to the assertions of the involved
adults. Gonzales, in other words, created abortion law that looks
and feels like family law, a distinct break from the Supreme
Court's prior abortion jurisprudence.
The Court's behavior raises the question of the wisdom of cre-
ating greater conformity between abortion law and extant family
law. A preliminary objection to this course of action is obvious: on
its face, the parent-child relationship between a mother and her
born child is likely different than the relationship a woman has
with a still-gestating fetus. There is a reason, in other words, why
many states allow women to surrender their children for adoption
only after their birth, and not before: 25 after birth, the tie has a
somewhat different quality. There is a reason why there often ap-
pears to be a more profound sense of loss when a young child dies
than when a miscarriage occurs. 26 Yet this objection alone is in-
sufficient. It is possible that these are differences in degree, not in
kind, between parental relationships with unborn and born chil-
dren, and between the vulnerability of born and unborn human
life. Gonzales's eyewitness description of intact D & E abortions,27
for example, portrays the relative vulnerability of the fetal life in-
volved. Gonzales also suggests that severing the woman-offspring
relationship through abortion can cause a kind of maternal suffer-
ing,28 basing its conclusion upon several sources-the Casey plu-
rality opinion, an amicus brief submitted by 180 post-abortion pa-
tients, and the statements of abortion doctors. 29 A body of scien-
tific literature confirms this possibility, indicating that some
23. Infra pt. II.A.
24. Id.
25. See e.g. Uniform Adoption Act § 2-404(a) (1994).
26. See generally Nancy Kohner & Alix Henley, When a Baby Dies: The Experience of
Late Miscarriage, Stillbirth and Neonatal Death (Pandora Press 1991).
27. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1622-23.
28. Id. at 1634.
29. Id. at 1632-34 (citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
852-53 (1992) (plurality); Br. for Sandra Cano, the Former "Mary Doe" of Doe v. Bolton,
and 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petr. 22-24, Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) [hereinafter Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women]).
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women's abortions affect their later parenting and family-life deci-
sions .30
Another possible reason for harmonizing abortion law with
the rest of family law merits recognition: the federal constitutional
law on abortion explicitly traces its origins to earlier constitu-
tional family law decisions on parent-child relations (discussed
further in part IV). From this perspective alone, perhaps abortion
law should be more consistent with the family law of parent-child
relations.
Sufficient reasons thus exist for pursuing greater harmony
between abortion law and the following family law inclinations re-
garding parent-child relations: first, taking as self-evident the ex-
istence of a bond between biological parents and their children;
and second, acknowledging children's vulnerability as self-evi-
dent. The consequences of this harmonizing require close consid-
eration. What are the likely consequences, not only for abortion
laws, but also for the well-being of women, children, other family
members, and society? It is an explicit fear of pro-choice advo-
cates that when lawmakers focus upon fetal vulnerability and ma-
ternal-child bonding, women lose, because society will come to see
women as it did in the past-fit only for maternal roles and
tasks. 31 Are there ways to acknowledge bonds between parents
and their children and children's dependence upon adult care
without "setting women back?"
Part II of this article explores family law's reliance on two
presumptions regarding parent-child relationships: the existence
of a natural bond between parents and their offspring and the vul-
nerability of children. Part III shows how these presumptions did
not figure into pre-Gonzales abortion jurisprudence. In fact, di-
rectly contrary presumptions often arose. Part IV discusses those
portions of the Gonzales majority opinion addressing the relation-
ship between a woman and her "unborn child,"32 and the vulnera-
bility of the latter. This part highlights the change Gonzales rep-
resents for abortion jurisprudence, particularly by contrasting the
Court's majority opinion with the dissenting opinion of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who relied heavily upon language and
themes stressed in prior abortion cases. Part V discusses the wis-
dom of extending typical family law presumptions about the par-
30. See infra nn. 194-205 and accompanying text.
31. See e.g. Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Wo-
man-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 991-92 (2007).
32. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1634.
Vol. 69412
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/3
ABORTION LAW
ent-child relationship to abortion law. This section also weighs
relevant empirical data and medical research on the relationship
between abortion and family well-being to demonstrate the wis-
dom of bringing abortion jurisprudence back into the family law
fold from which it sprang. The conclusion suggests possible conse-
quences of this course of action.
II. Two FAMILY LAW PRESUMPTIONS REGARDING THE
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
A. Parents and Children Have a Relationship
the Law Should Protect
Many of the most familiar areas of family law operate upon
the assumption that it is self-evident that biological parents 33
have a strong natural bond with their children. Particular laws,
therefore, act to protect and preserve those bonds. In the area of
adoption, for example, the law regularly allows time for natural
parents to change their minds after the initial surrender of their
biological child to a would-be adoptive parent or parents. 34 Even
in states that do not provide a set time period within which a nat-
ural parent may revoke consent, consent may ordinarily be re-
voked upon evidence of fraud, undue influence, or duress. 35 States
must also provide opportunities for an unmarried biological father
to receive notice and be heard regarding proceedings that may ter-
minate his parental rights in order to transfer them to an adoptive
parent or parents.36
Statutes determining legal parentage, including the rights
and obligations incident to parentage, are another obvious place to
look for legal acceptance of the presumption that biological par-
ents are attached to their children. Such statutes usually rely
upon genetic and gestational connections to determine parentage.
The statute of Rhode Island is typical: "[b]irth parent" means
33. This article focuses on biological parents because of the biological relationship be-
tween women seeking abortions and the fetuses they carry.
34. See e.g. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-220(b)(1)(A) (West 2003) (allowing revocation within
10 days if in best interest of child); 23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 2711 (West 2004); Uniform
Adoption Act § 2-404(a) (1994) (permitting revocation within 192 hours of child's birth).
35. See e.g. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210 § 2 (West 1998); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-104(7)
(West 2005).
36. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983).
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"[t]he person who is legally presumed under the laws of this state
to be the father or mother of genetic origin of a child."37
Another area of family law demonstrating the law's prefer-
ence for preserving the relationships between parents and their
children concerns child abuse or neglect. When the state seeks to
terminate parental rights on either ground, the law sets the hur-
dles high. The state must provide "clear and convincing evidence"
of the existence of parental misconduct or failure, often in addition
to evidence that terminating the biological parent's rights would
be in the child's best interests. 38 Additionally, even after a child is
removed from his or her biological parent's home, the State must
make a reasonable effort to reunify the child with his or her par-
ents.39 Even the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997,40 which emphasizes permanency planning for children over
family reunification to a much greater degree than earlier law,
continues to require reasonable reunification efforts, except in
dire circumstances such as very lengthy foster care periods, mur-
der, or felony assault. 41
In the area of custody law, the Supreme Court has held that a
parent has a federal constitutional right to the primary custody
and care of his or her children.42 Additionally, in custody contests
between two parents, a significant number of U.S. jurisdictions
look favorably upon joint custody awards in the name of preserv-
ing the child's relationship with both biological parents.43 Several
jurisdictions have moved to joint custody presumptions out of def-
erence to the importance of maintaining all parent-child bonds.44
37. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7.2-1(6) (2007); see also Cal. Fain. Code § 8512 (2004) (defining
"blirth parent" as "the biological parent, or, in the case of a person previously adopted, the
adoptive parent").
38. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982); see e.g. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.447.4
(Supp. 1997); In re A.M.C., 32 S.W.3d 155, 158 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-
11-94(a) (2007); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (2004); In re Int. of Shelby L., 699 N.W.2d 392, 397
(2005).
39. See e.g. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(C)(iii) (2007).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2000).
41. Id. at § 671(a)(15)(D).
42. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (explaining "[i]t is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents").
43. See Linda D. Elrod, Child Custody Practice and Procedure ch. 5 (rev. ed., West 2004
& Supp. 2006).
44. David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 Hofstra L.
Rev. 1461, 1471-72 (2006) (citing Andrew I. Schepard, Children, Courts and Custody: In-
terdisciplinary Models for Divorcing Families, 57 British J. of Sociology 730 (2006); Linda
D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: "Same-Sex" Marriage
Issue Dominates Headlines, 38 Fam. L.Q. 777, 789-95 (2005)).
Vol. 69414
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Even considering that joint custody has come under additional
scrutiny recently,45 it remains legally and personally ideal for par-
ents to cooperate in serving the bests interests of the child.
46
Even when a biological parent loses a custody or visitation
dispute to a person who is not a biological parent, it may be on the
ground that the latter person has formed a parent-like relation-
ship-as a "psychological" or "de facto" parent-with the child, a
relationship that the biological parent has allowed or even en-
couraged to form.47 In other words, the grant of custody or visita-
tion rights to one who is not a child's biological parent is a varia-
tion on the general theme or presumption of deference to the par-
ent-child bond, not a rejection of it.
This brief overview of some of the most frequently litigated
areas of family law indicates that lawmakers regularly act on the
presumption that the bonds between parents and their biological
children are self-evident and ought to be preserved. Another pre-
sumption that permeates family law concerns the vulnerability of
the child.
B. Children Are Self-Evidently Vulnerable and Require the
Protection of Their Parents or, Failing This, of the State
A second presumption underlies a significant number of fam-
ily laws: children are self-evidently vulnerable, particularly rela-
tive to adults, and require special solicitude and protection. Par-
ents have the first duty and first right to shield their vulnerable
children; if they fail, the state may intervene on the children's be-
half.
Federal constitutional law regarding parent-child relation-
ships highlights children's relative vulnerability by insisting that
the primary trait of the legal relationship between parents and
45. Meyer, supra n. 44, at 1472-73. "Initially, joint custody was eagerly embraced by
legislators and judges as a way of validating and encouraging the involvement of both par-
ents. Over time, its reception has become more mixed. Some have criticized joint custody
on the ground that it awards fathers rights without corresponding duties, and that it has
induced some mothers to cede property or support rights in exchange for sole custody. And
some scholars have recently detected a general retreat from joint custody, with more judges
limiting it to cases where both parents consent to the idea."
46. Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody after
Divorce, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 687, 705 (1985) (suggesting that empirical evidence demonstrates
"regular contact with both parents" after divorce provides a child improved parenting).
47. See e.g. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 541-42 (N.J. 2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959, 962 (R.I. 2000); Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking up a Family or Putting It Back
Together Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody
Cases, 37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1045 (1996).
2008 415
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children is "duty." John Locke's Second Treatise on Government
summarizes well the position articulated over time in U.S. family
law: "[tihe Power that Parents have over their Children, arises
from that Duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their
Offspring."48
Beginning in early constitutional cases addressing the rela-
tionship between parents and the State relative to children, the
Supreme Court explicitly articulated versions of this Lockean
principle. 49 In a case affirming parents' rights to direct their chil-
dren's education, for example, the Court said: "those who nurture
[the child] and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga-
tions."50 In a later case concerning the right of an unwed father to
notice and a hearing regarding the adoption of his biological child,
the Court stated explicitly that the "rights of the parents are a
counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed." 51 After
finding that the father had not stepped forward to assume respon-
sibility for the child, the Court held that the "Federal Constitution
will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of
where the child's best interests lie."52 The State, rather, could
move forward without the father to consider the child's best inter-
ests.
Child protection laws also illustrate family law's concern for
children's vulnerability as well as the State's willingness to inter-
vene when parents are unwilling or unable to protect their own
children. Increased sensitivity to children's physical and mental
vulnerability relative to adults has led to increasingly widespread
and effective lawmaking in recent decades.
Many other areas of family law involve the shielding of chil-
dren. For example, bans on incestuous marriages are based, in
part, upon the belief that such marriages are most likely to disad-
vantage young children at risk of being exploited by older rela-
tives. 53 Limits upon the age at which children may marry without
parental or judicial consent are also based upon children's imma-
48. John Locke, Second Treatise on Government § 58 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal
Arts Lib. 1952).
49. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Socy. of Sisters, 268 U.S 510, 535
(1925).
50. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
51. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249-50, 257 (1983).
52. Id. at 262.
53. Student Author, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the
"Sexual Family", 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2464, 2464 (2006).
416 Vol. 69
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turity and consequent vulnerability. 54 Adoption-the extinguish-
ing of a parent's rights over a particular child and the establish-
ment of new parental rights in another-is not effective by mere
private agreement, but requires a state inquiry into the fitness of
the adoptive parents. 55 States also will not automatically agree to
custody and child support terms privately agreed upon by divorc-
ing parents in a separation agreement. 56 Finally, prior to grant-
ing a divorce, an increasing number of jurisdictions require par-
ents to complete "parent education" courses to learn how to effec-
tively parent children in a post-divorce context.57
C. A Caveat
Two particular areas of family law have not adopted the pre-
sumptions about parent-child bonds and children's vulnerability
described above. These include the areas of assisted reproductive
technologies (ARTs) and same-sex marriage. It appears, rather,
they have been more strongly influenced by pre-Gonzales abortion
precedents stressing adult needs and interests, while exhibiting
indifference toward the separation of children from their biologi-
cal parents. For example, it is generally agreed that the dearth of
regulation regarding ARTs-consequently permitting the separa-
tion of children from their biological parents and the triumph of
adult interests-is traceable, in part, to abortion law. The 2004
report from the President's Council on Bioethics, Reproduction
and Responsibility, listed as a probable reason for the lack of regu-
lation regarding ARTs that
[p]roposed efforts to regulate or monitor assisted reproduction are
viewed by many people through the prism of Roe v. Wade. ... De-
fenders of reproductive freedom want no infringement of the right to
make personal reproductive decisions .... This situation creates a
powerful disincentive for any regulation of the uses of reproductive
technologies. 58
54. Lynn Wardle, International Marriage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition: A
Survey, 29 Fam. L.Q. 497, 501 (1995).
55. See e.g. 1 Ohio Fam. Law § 3.20 (Bender & Co., 2006); 1-16 N.J. Fam. Law § 16-15
(Bender & Co., 2004).
56. See e.g. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 306(b), 9A U.L.A. 249 (1998).
57. Margie J. Geasler & Karen R. Blaisure, 1998 Nationwide Survey of Court-Con-
nected Divorce Education Programs, 37 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 36 (1999); Jeffrey T.
Cookston et al., Prospects for Expanded Parent Education Services for Divorcing Families
with Children, 40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 190 (2002).
58. The President's Council on Bioethics, Reproduction & Responsibility: The Regula-
tion of New Biotechnologies 8 (Mar. 2004) (available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/
2008
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In the only federal court of appeals decision to affirm a constitu-
tional right to procreate using ARTs, Lifchez v. Hartigan,59 the
Court affirmed a lower court's holding that the right of "privacy
and reproductive freedom as established in Roe v. Wade' 60 was
broad enough to encompass a right to access in-vitro fertilization.
Consequently, today neither state nor federal laws ban trans-
actions of sperm, eggs, or embryos, with the result that children
are regularly separated from their biological parents. State par-
entage laws simply confirm adult choices in this regard by cutting
off any parental rights of gamete or embryo "donors" and vesting
such rights in the person or persons intending to rear the child. 61
Nor are there laws protecting children from risks posed to their
health by ART procedures or outcomes, including but not limited
to multiple births, genetic abnormalities, pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis, selective reduction (the aborting of one or more fetuses
in multiple pregnancies), and egg or embryo freezing and thaw-
ing.62
The development of the law concerning same-sex unions has
also sometimes relied upon pre-Gonzales abortion law and re-
flected the latter's stance toward parent-child relations and chil-
dren's vulnerability. Roe and Casey were relied upon explicitly by
the plaintiffs in Goodridge v. Massachusetts Department of Public
Health63 to argue that the Constitution protects adult individuals'
"personal decisions" about the family, including the decision to
marry a person of the same sex.64 These same cases were refer-
enced by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in concluding that de-
cisions about "whether and how to establish a family" are matters
of "individual" liberty. 65 In the end, the Goodridge court affirmed
unions that, by definition, result in the separation of every child of
every such union from at least one of his or her biological par-
reproductionandresponsibility/_pcbe-final-reproduction-and-responsibility.pdf) [hereinaf-
ter President's Bioethics Report].
59. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990), af/d without opinion, 914
F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Scholberg v. Lifchez, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991).
60. Id. at 1363 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
61. President's Bioethics Report, supra n. 58, at 51 n. 95; Harry D. Krause et al., Family
Law: Cases, Comments and Questions 399-401 (6th ed., Thomson West 2007); Helen Al-
vard, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children's Rights Perspective,
40 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 26-27 (2003).
62. Id. at 26-30.
63. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
64. See Pl.'s Mot. S.J., Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
65. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959.
Vol. 69418
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ents.66 The court also performed a noticeably cursory and biased
review of the literature on children's well-being in same-sex
households before concluding that granting "marriage" status to
such unions would not harm children's interests. 67
The contents of these two areas of family law do not alter the
conclusion that family law generally has accepted as self-evident a
bond between parents and their children, and children's vulnera-
bility and need for protection. Rather, these areas simply confirm
the influence of abortion law. The treatment of parent-child rela-
tionships in both of these areas also suggests that, unless Gonza-
les marks the beginning of a change, abortion law is already influ-
encing family law's treatment of born children and their relation-
ship with their parents.
It is axiomatic in family law that children are relatively vul-
nerable, and that the law should willingly intervene when chil-
dren are at risk. It is also assumed that parents feel bonded to
their children and that family law should take care to preserve
these bonds when possible. This article now turns to abortion law
to consider how the U.S. Supreme Court's pre-Gonzales abortion
cases declined to incorporate either of these presumptions. In-
stead, the Court has generally ignored both, and in some cases,
supplanted them with contrary presumptions.
III. How THE SUPREME COURT'S ABORTION CASES HAVE
IGNORED OR CONTRADICTED FAMILY LAW'S PRESUMPTIONS
REGARDING PARENTAL ATTACHMENT AND CHILD VULNERABILITY
Numerous Supreme Court decisions address the constitution-
ality of state or federal abortion regulations or restrictions. Gen-
erally, while some of the Court's decisions make passing reference
to the painful or difficult 68 nature of the abortion decision-pre-
sumably an oblique reference to a relationship between the wo-
man and her developing fetus-most portray an unplanned preg-
66. Id. at 968.
67. Id. at 961-64; see also Helen M. Alvar6, The Turn toward the Self in the Law of
Marriage & Family: Same-Sex Marriage & Its Predecessors, 16 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 135,
171-82 (2005) (addressing in detail the treatment of children's interests in each of the lead-
ing state cases affirming same-sex unions and in the Massachusetts Constitutional Con-
vention considering same-sex marriage).
68. See e.g. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (plural-
ity) (explaining that "[abortion] is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the wo-
man who must live with the implications of her decision; ... for the spouse, family, and
society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some
deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life").
2008 419
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nancy as a confrontation between the respective rights of the wo-
man and the fetus, in which the State sides with the fetus, against
the woman.69 Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence also com-
monly demonstrates a preference for terminating relationships
rather than preserving them, in the face of claims that a born
child burdens a woman's ability to realize her interests. 70 Rather
than stressing the vulnerability of the fetus, abortion cases devote
considerable attention to the vulnerability of the woman seeking
an abortion. 71 The Court's inability to decide, during three de-
cades of decisions, precisely what to call the woman and the fetus
in an abortion procedure is symbolic of the Court's reluctance to
employ family relationship concepts in abortion cases. Terminol-
ogy is important because without a "child" and a "mother," by defi-
nition there can be no parent-child relationship at issue in the
abortion context.
The leading abortion cases-Roe v. Wade,72 Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,73 Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,74 Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey,75 and Stenberg v. Carhart76-accu-
rately capture the most crucial themes and language concerning
parent-child relations present in the Court's pre-Gonzales abor-
tion jurisprudence.
A. Strength of Biological Parent-Child Relationship
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court began the practice of us-
ing several terms per case to refer to the entity being aborted and
the woman seeking the abortion. Sometimes the Court called the
former a "fetus,"77 sometimes "prenatal life,"7 8 sometimes "poten-
tial life"79 or the "potentiality of human life,"80 sometimes an "un-
born,"8 1 and sometimes an "unborn child."8 2 At other times, the
69. Infra pt. III.A.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73. Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
74. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
75. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality).
76. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
77. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
78. Id. at 156.
79. Id. at 163.
80. Id. at 162.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Court avoided a label completely, calling abortion only a woman's
right to "terminate her pregnancy."8 3 As for the woman, she was
called, alternately, the "pregnant woman,"84 the "patient,"8 5 the
"woman,"86 and the "mother" whose "maternal health"87 was at
stake. The Roe Court also pioneered another theme that would
figure prominently in later abortion cases: what lay between the
mother and the fetus in her womb was a contest, not a relation-
ship.8 On the child's side, the contest was waged by the State,
whose interest begins in earnest at viability because the fetus pre-
sumably "has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb."89
The Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists case, seven years post-Roe, involved a statute as likely
as any to invite the Court to consider the topic of a parent-child
relationship in the abortion context. Pennsylvania had passed an
"informed consent" law requiring abortion doctors to inform their
patients about the availability of certain information regarding fe-
tal development, possible medical risks of abortion, risks of child-
birth, and various types of financial and medical assistance that
might be available to her.90 The Thornburgh Court, rather than
taking the opportunity to note any possible maternal-fetal rela-
tionship, spoke as if there existed a contest between the mother
and the fetus. It did so by characterizing Pennsylvania's informed
consent provisions as means to "confuse," "punish,"91 and "intimi-
date" women into continuing their pregnancies. 92
Nine years later, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services93 of-
fered the Court another opportunity to discuss the possibility of a
mother-child relationship in the abortion context. The Missouri
legislature had passed a law with a preamble stating that the
"natural parents of an unborn child had protectable interests in
the life, health and well-being of their unborn child."94 Like Roe,
83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
84. Id. at 162.
85. Id. at 163.
86. Id. at 162.
87. Id. at 163-64.
88. Id.
89. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
90. Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760-61
(1986).
91. Id. at 762.
92. Id. at 759.
93. Webster v. Reprod. Health Serus., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
94. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.205.1(3) (1986).
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however, the Webster Court exhibited uncertainty as to the nature
of the parties of interest in an abortion context. It referred to the
fetus as both "potential human life"95 and "a form of human life."
96
The woman seeking the abortion was most often referred to sim-
ply as "the woman"97 or the "pregnant woman,"98 yet her status as
mother was also indirectly confirmed by reference to her "mater-
nal health."99 Webster also very explicitly envisioned the mother
and child in a contest versus a relationship, stating the balance
the Court struck in abortion cases was between the "claims of the
State to protect the fetus as a form of human life against the
claims of a woman to decide for herself whether or not to abort."'100
Even the 1992 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey' 0 ' decision-regarded as a substantial setback
by pro-choice activists due to its holding that abortion is a consti-
tutional "liberty" interest as opposed to a "fundamental" right-
did not move abortion law in the direction of family law on parent-
child relations. The Casey Court, rather, continued the theme of
confrontation. The Court portrayed the abortion right as protect-
ing the liberty of the "individual" woman 10 2 against the state's in-
terest in what the Court now called "the life of the fetus that may
become a child."10 3 The Casey plurality observed, but did not fur-
ther develop, that abortion was "an act fraught with consequences
for others," including the spouse, the family, society, doctors, the
woman, and, "depending on one's beliefs, for the life or potential
life that is aborted.' 0 4 In the end, though, despite acknowledging
obliquely the possibility that some family members might feel
themselves in some sort of relationship with the fetus, the Casey
Court struck down Pennsylvania's law requiring a woman to no-
tify her spouse about her abortion plans.10 5
Finally, in Stenberg v. Carhart,0 6 the Supreme Court's first
"partial-birth abortion" decision, the Court stressed that the para-
mount interest in abortion jurisprudence is the woman's interest
95. Webster, 429 U.S. at 515.
96. Id. at 520.
97. See e.g. id. at 508.
98. Id. at 509.
99. Id. at 515.
100. Id. at 520.
101. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality).
102. Id. at 853.
103. Id. at 846.
104. Id. at 852.
105. Id. at 901.
106. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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in "choos[ing] whether to have an... abortion."10 7 There was no
suggestion of any relationship between the woman, or anybody
else, and the fetus. The Court referred to the fetus as a "preg-
nancy," "potential human life," and "the contents [of the
uterus] "-language far removed from the idea of a parent-child
relationship.-0 8 For the most part, the Court referred to women
seeking abortions simply as "women,"'1 9 although there were
some references to a woman's "maternal" situation"0 and to the
woman as a "mother" (through citations to an earlier case). 111
The family law theme of a self-evident relationship between
parent and biological child is noticeably absent in the Supreme
Court's leading abortion decisions. Rather, the Court's abortion
cases refrain from casting the fetus in the role of a child and the
woman in the role of a mother, instead envisioning the woman
and the State locked in a contest over the fate of the fetus, a con-
test in which the woman's freedom is very much at stake.
B. Vulnerability of the Child
Supreme Court abortion cases lack a second theme common to
discussions of parent-child relations within family law: the vul-
nerability of the child and the corresponding duties of the parents
and the State to shield the child. Instead, these cases stress the
vulnerabilities of the woman seeking an abortion and of women in
society generally, on account of their status as child-bearers. To
the extent children's relative weakness is acknowledged at all, the
Court suggests that children born following unwanted
pregnancies will likely suffer unhappiness.
Looking first at Roe, its most substantial discussion of the fe-
tus concerns whether there is anything in the history of the Con-
stitution or U.S. law to indicate that lawmakers understood the
fetus to be a legal "person" entitled to the 14th Amendment's pro-
tection of "life."" 2 The Court concluded that there was not: "[i]n
short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as per-
sons in the whole sense.""13 It was the pregnant woman's vulner-
ability, instead, that took center stage in Roe. Immediately follow-
107. Id. at 930 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 (plurality)).
108. Id. at 923.
109. Id. at 929.
110. Id. at 928.
111. Id. at 930 (quoting Casey, 530 U.S. at 879 (plurality)).
112. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-62 (1973).
113. Id. at 162.
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ing its announcement that the Constitution contains a privacy
right that includes abortion, the Court expounded in emotional
terms the harms women might suffer without access to legal abor-
tion:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant wo-
man by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and di-
rect harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the wo-
man a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be immi-
nent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the un-
wanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.
In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continu-
ing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
1 14
In Thornburgh, Pennsylvania seemed to invite consideration
of the theme of child vulnerability with its statute requiring that
near-viability abortions be performed using the method most
likely to deliver the child alive. 115 But again, the Court's opinion
spoke only about the woman's vulnerability. In fact, the Thorn-
burgh opinion is noteworthy among all abortion opinions for its
near-complete focus upon the woman's situation, establishing that
a woman should bear no increased medical risk at all to preserve
the life of her viable fetus,11 6 a theme that would appear in later
abortion cases. It was only in Justice White's dissent in Thorn-
burgh that the family law theme of the child's vulnerability ap-
peared. He stated that, although the Court had located the abor-
tion right in constitutional family law stressing parental duties to
children, abortion involves parents "assault[ing]" versus protect-
ing their children. 11 7
The Webster Court upheld the nonbinding preamble of a Mis-
souri law, reciting the "protectable interests in life, health, and
well-being" of the unborn child, who possesses "all the rights, priv-
ileges, and immunities available to other persons."" 8 However, it
did not address the theme of the vulnerability of children.
Casey returned to and expanded the theme of the woman's
vulnerability. The Casey plurality emphasized that women are
114. Id. at 153.
115. Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769
(1986).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 792 n. 2.
118. Webster v. Reprod. Health Serus., 429 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1989) (quoting Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 1.205.1(1), (2), 1.205.2 (1986)).
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not only vulnerable when they have unwanted pregnancies, but
are generally socially vulnerable due to their ability to bear chil-
dren. On the first theme, the Court opined that a woman requires
a right to abortion to avoid the "anxieties" and "physical con-
straints" that "only she must bear" in a pregnancy. 119 On the sec-
ond theme, the plurality claimed that the abortion right is an es-
sential part of the foundation of modern social freedoms for wo-
men. Women have long relied "on the availability of abortion in
the event that contraception should fail."120 In other words, abor-
tion provides women definitive "control [over] their reproductive
lives."1 2 1 Without abortion, said the Court, a woman's right to
"participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation"
would be compromised. 122
The Casey Court considered the possible vulnerability of the
fetus only once, and only post-birth. Seemingly presuming that an
unwanted pregnancy would always result in an unwanted child or
a child without proper assistance, the Court opined that "[a par-
ent's] inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a
cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent.'1 23
Stenberg, relying heavily on Casey, also stressed the woman's
vulnerability as opposed to that of the fetus. 124 The Court focused
on the woman's vulnerability despite the nature of the abortion
procedure at issue in that case, which the Court acknowledged to
be "gruesome" and "distressing"125 as it involves "skull penetra-
tion" and "vacuuming out the.., brain" of a nearly fully delivered
fetal body. 126 Rather, the Stenberg Court discussed at significant
length the mother's health interests in maintaining access to
every abortion method believed by some groups of doctors to pro-
vide a marginal safety benefit for the mother in a particular in-
stance.127 Only when referring to the opinion of some Americans
that abortion is the "death of an innocent child"128 did the major-
ity opinion use language ascribing any vulnerability to the fetus.
119. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (plurality).
120. Id. at 856.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 853.
124. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937-38 (2000).
125. Id. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring); Casey, 505 U.S. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring).
126. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 959-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 931-38.
128. Id. at 920.
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In sum, not only do abortion opinions fail to acknowledge the
two family law themes described above, but they actually propose
distinctly contrary themes. The next part describes how the Gon-
zales Court reversed the course of abortion jurisprudence by af-
firming an attachment between biological parents and their off-
spring and emphasizing the vulnerability of fetal life.
IV. GONZALES: ABORTION LAW THAT LooKs LIKE FAMILY LAW
The majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart brings abortion
jurisprudence into greater conformity with family law's presump-
tions about parent-child relations. This part will analyze this
shift in the order of the two family law themes identified above,
then highlight the significance of the majority's opinion by con-
trasting its language and themes with those found in the dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Ginsburg.
A. Biological Parents' Attachment to Their Own Children
The majority opinion in Gonzales states outright that a bond
exists between a woman and her biological offspring and that the
severance of this bond via abortion-particularly via the intact D
& E procedure-may cause significant and lasting pain for the wo-
man. Regarding the bond itself, the majority wrote: "[rlespect for
human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the
mother has for her child."1 29 The Court's use of language like
"mother" and "child" places the analysis immediately into a family
law context. So does the majority's choice of labels for the fetus
like "a living organism while within the womb," "unborn child[ I,"
"infant life," and "child assuming the human form."130
Continuing its discussion of the relationship between a wo-
man and her offspring, the Court further observed that as a conse-
quence of this bond abortion can be a "difficult and painful moral
decision." 13' It stated that "some women come to regret their
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Se-
129. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007).
130. See id. at 1615-16, 1620, 1634.
131. Id. at 1617 (citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852-53
(1992) (plurality)). It is unusual, maybe unique, to see this phrase used in the introduction
of an argument to allow any aspect of the right of abortion to be restricted by the state.
Usually one sees this observation at the beginning of an argument in favor of retaining the
abortion right as the private choice of a particular woman to make such difficult and moral
decisions without interference by the state. See e.g. id.
Vol. 69426
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vere depression and loss of esteem can follow."132 For these
points, the majority opinion cited an amicus brief filed by 180 wo-
men who experienced abortion, led by the woman who was the
plaintiff in Doe v. Bolton 33 (Roe's companion case). The Court ob-
served that women, as a consequence of the mother-child bond,
would likely suffer more anguish if doctors were allowed to per-
form intact D & E abortions. The Court based this conclusion on
two sources. First, it looked to the testimony of doctors in a New
York case challenging a partial-birth abortion ban, stating that
"they do not describe to their patients what [the D & E and intact
D & E] procedures entail in clear and precise terms."1 34 Second, it
considered the claimed self-evident fact that a woman, post-abor-
tion, would likely suffer greater anguish after learning that an in-
tact D & E was performed, because she "allowed a doctor to pierce
the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn
child, a child assuming the human form." 35
A final noteworthy aspect of the Court's treatment of the
mother-child bond is how prominently it figures in the legal out-
come of Gonzales. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, in part based on evidence of the
possible harm to women, society, the medical profession, and "re-
spect for life"136 stemming from the performance of intact D & E
abortions. As a result, the Court could not conclude that the "con-
gressional purpose" of the act was to "place a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion."' 37
B. Children's Vulnerability
The Gonzales majority opinion also spoke specifically of the
self-evident vulnerability of children and the corresponding duties
arising from such vulnerability. The most significant means by
which the Gonzales majority highlighted this theme was its rela-
tively lengthy and detailed descriptions of abortion methods, in-
cluding but not limited to intact D & E.
132. Id. at 1634 (internal quotations omitted).
133. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
134. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1634 (quoting Natl. Abortion Fedn. v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp.
2d 436, 466 n. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)) (brackets in original).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1635 (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878
(1992) (plurality)).
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The first relevant aspect of the Court's descriptions is its reg-
ular use of hard-hitting words to describe what abortion methods
do to fetal bodies: "killing," "decapitating," "crushing," "piercing,"
"ripping," "dismemberment," and "caus[ing] the fetus to tear
apart."138 It notes that the doctor might have to make ten to fif-
teen "passes" in order to pull out all of the pieces of the fetal
body. 139 Yet, even this language highlighting fetal vulnerability
pales in comparison to the Court's incorporation into its opinion of
the entire eyewitness account of a partial-birth abortion provided
by a nurse at a hearing before Congress:
Dr. Haskell went in with forceps and grabbed the baby's legs
and pulled them down into the birth canal. Then he delivered the
baby's body and the arms-everything but the head. The doctor
kept the head right inside the uterus ....
The baby's little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his
little feet were kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the
back of his head, and the baby's arms jerked out, like a startle reac-
tion, like a flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall.
The doctor opened up the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction
tube into the opening, and sucked the baby's brains out. Now the
baby went completely limp ....
He cut the umbilical cord and delivered the placenta. He threw
the baby in a pan, along with the placenta and the instruments he
had just used. 140
Finally, the Gonzales Court emphasized the child's vulnera-
bility with its statements regarding how others witnessing, per-
forming, or even thinking of the procedure (including the woman
herself) may be affected. They experience the child as helpless
and dependent. Regarding the doctors who perform abortions, for
example, the Court referred to the statement of a doctor at the
trial level that it is a "difficult situation"14' for medical staff who
find themselves dealing with a fetus that has still "some viability
to it, some movement of limbs."1 42 The Court held that the gov-
ernment can legitimately conclude that a procedure such as intact
D & E-which is more "shocking"' 43 than other abortion proce-
dures-might cause a coarsening of the profession trained to care
for human lives, and of the public's view of the profession, espe-
138. Id. at 1614-17, 1621-24, 1628-29.
139. Id. at 1621.
140. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1622-23 (citing H.R. Rpt. No. 108-58, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2003))
(ellipses in original).
141. Id. at 1623.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1634.
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cially due to how the procedure "perverts a process during which
life is brought into the world."'144
C. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
The changes made by Gonzales to federal constitutional abor-
tion law can be understood more clearly by contrasting the major-
ity's opinion in that case with Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opin-
ion. Emphatically restating themes found in earlier abortion
cases, most particularly Casey, Justice Ginsburg stated that the
centerpiece of abortion jurisprudence is "woman's autonomy to de-
termine her life's course and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stat-
ure." 145 No matter which dictionary one consults, "autonomy" ap-
pears as a concept opposite to the notion of "relationship." It de-
scribes behavior that is "self-governing," "self-directing,"1 46 and
"independent. '1 47 It is derived from the Greek autonomia, mean-
ing "having its own laws."148 Justice Ginsburg would have held in
Gonzales that if some doctors claim that a banned abortion proce-
dure is marginally safer for a woman in any particular circum-
stances, the ban must fall, with no need to consider how the proce-
dure treats the fetus. 149
Concerning the particular question of the existence of a
mother-child bond-and whether abortion might therefore cause
pain to women-Justice Ginsburg was emphatic that women do
not suffer significantly harmful effects from their abortions. 150 In
an extraordinarily long footnote, Justice Ginsburg cited studies
and articles disclaiming the existence of anything like "post-abor-
tion syndrome."' 5 ' For now, it suffices to say that Justice Gins-
burg seemed more eager to disclaim the possibility of abortion-re-
lated suffering than the evidence might support, or even than her
prior statements have suggested. Further discussion of the
weight and content of these articles is contained in part V below.
144. Id. at 1635 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531 Cong. Findings at (14)(K) (2000 ed., Supp. 1V)).
145. Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
146. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, www.m-w.com/dictionary/autonomy (accessed
May 30, 2008).
147. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed., Houghton Mif-
flin 2000).
148. AskOxford.com, http://www.askoxford.conconcise-oed/autonomyview=uk (acces-
sed May 30, 2008).
149. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1644-45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 1648.
151. Id. at 1648 n. 7.
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Finally, Justice Ginsburg restated the theme found so often in
pre-Gonzales abortion cases about the vulnerability of women.
Using language and terms more insistent than any found in ear-
lier abortion opinions, Justice Ginsburg opined that without legal
abortion, women would be returned to the sort of pre-feminist ex-
istence of "ancient" times, vulnerable to all earlier preconceptions
and oppressions that had beset women. 152 She presented abor-
tion, in other words, as a linchpin of female liberation, central to
women's lives. 153 No portion of her opinion considered fetal vul-
nerability.
There is no guarantee in the volatile world of Supreme Court
abortion opinions (a sort of judicial soap opera for academics and
even the public) that the new majority perspective on abortion at
the Supreme Court will "hold" for one more opinion, for none, or
for many. In fact, toward the end of her stinging dissent, Justice
Ginsburg finally declared that "[a] decision so at odds with our
jurisprudence should not have staying power."'1 54 There is no
doubt, however, that if it holds, abortion law will come to look
more like the rest of family law. The following part suggests that
there is wisdom in better harmonizing abortion law with the rest
of family law.
V. THE RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING FAMILY LAW PRESUMPTIONS
IN ABORTION CASES
Some assume that abortion law inherently must remain dis-
tinct from the remainder of family law given that the former con-
cerns preventing the coming to fruition of a developed family rela-
tionship, a parent-child relationship. Yet there are several rea-
sons why this might be too simplistic a conclusion, both at the
practical, experiential level and at the level of the law.
A. Abortion Law Derived from Family Law
In Roe v. Wade, women's constitutional right to choose abor-
tion was grounded in large part upon earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions about parents' fundamental rights respecting the custody
and care of their children. In the course of seeking constitutional
support for the existence of a privacy right sufficiently broad to
encompass abortion, Roe specifically cited and relied upon previ-
152. Id. at 1649.
153. Id. at 1649-50, 1653.
154. Id. at 1653.
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ously identified substantive due process rights concerning "family
relationships" and parents' rights to make decisions about "child
rearing and education."155 Here, the Court cited its prior deci-
sions in Prince v. Massachusetts,156 Meyer v. Nebraska,157 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.158
Yet in each of these cases, the two family law presumptions
discussed above are fully apparent. The Prince Court, for exam-
ple, spoke famously of the rights and duties of biological parents
with respect to their dependent children: "It is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."159 Prince
also spoke clearly about the child's relative vulnerability and need
for protection, citing society's "interests ... to protect the welfare
of children, and the state's assertion of authority to that end."160
"The last is no mere corporate concern of official authority," con-
tinued the Court, but "the interest of youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and
given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-de-
veloped men and citizens."161
In his dissent in the Thornburgh case, Justice Byron White
acknowledged the Roe Court's explicit reliance on family law
precedents. He wrote,
[t]he Court has justified the recognitions of a woman's fundamental
right to terminate her pregnancy by invoking decisions upholding
claims of personal autonomy in connection with the conduct of fam-
ily life, the rearing of children, marital privacy, the use of contracep-
tives and the preservation of the individual's capacity to procre-
ate. 162
Thus, Roe saw the relationship between a woman and her fetal
offspring in the context of parent-child relationships, relationships
which had heretofore been understood to be dominated by notions
of parental attachment and duty toward children.163 But is this a
sufficient reason to insist that abortion law operate according to
155. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
156. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1914).
157. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
158. Pierce v. Socy. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
159. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. 510).
160. Id. at 165.
161. Id.
162. Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 791
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
163. See supra pt. II.
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the same presumptions employed generally in family law dealing
with the parent-child relationship? Is consistency the highest
value in this situation? Or is it better to say that since the vast
body of family law involves born children, it is nonsensical to care
whether abortion law is out of step with the rest of family law?
The next section suggests that this latter conclusion is wrong, be-
cause, insofar as family well-being is concerned, there is not a
clean break between the way in which adults and society experi-
ence and perceive decisions about unborn and born children.
B. The Abortion Decision May Be Experienced
as a "Family Decision"
There is evidence that abortion is experienced by some women
and men as a decision about parenting, before, during, and after
the abortion decision itself. The abortion may, for example, cause
grief similar to the grief experienced at the loss of a born child.
The child's innocence and vulnerability may play a role in both
situations. Abortion may also affect decisions about whether or
not to have children in the future. Or it may affect the quality of
adults' relationships with future children, or with one another.
Pro-choice advocates, including Justice Ginsburg and others,
speak in two conflicting ways about the evidence regarding any
link between abortion and parenting decisions. On the one hand,
they regularly acknowledge that abortion is "painfully diffi-
cult,"164 presumably because the woman has feelings for her off-
spring or feelings about what the abortion procedure does to him
or her. It is common, for example, for pro-choice politicians to af-
firm the emotional difficulties of having an abortion to the point of
advocating a national campaign to reduce abortion. Senator Hil-
lary Clinton, a 2008 Democratic presidential primary candidate,
regularly affirmed that abortion should be "safe, legal and rare,"
and recently supported a "zero" abortions goal for the nation. 165
She has referred to abortion as "sad," "tragic," and "the most diffi-
cult [decision] that a woman will ever make."' 66 Senator Barack
Obama, the 2008 Democratic presidential nominee, has referred
to women "anguish[ing] over [abortion] decisions" and promised to
164. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1648 n. 7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
165. Christina Bellantoni, Hillary's 'Zero'Abortions Goal Hit; Both Sides See Little Con-
sensus, Wash. Times As (June 8, 2007).
166. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton to the NYS
Family Planning Providers (Jan. 24, 2005) (available at http://clinton.senate.gov/-clinton/
speeches/2005125A05.html).
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work to prevent unwanted pregnancies. 1 67 Former U.S. presiden-
tial candidate and Mayor of New York City Rudolph Giuliani has
spoken quite similarly. 168 All are implicitly observing that abor-
tion involves the choice to deliberately prevent or terminate a par-
ent-child relationship.
On the other hand, those supporting legal abortion insist that
claims of post-abortion maternal suffering influencing future be-
havior are scientifically wrong and even socially disastrous for wo-
men. Justice Ginsburg's Gonzales dissent is an excellent example
of this argument. 69 A leading abortion scholar, Reva Siegel (on
whom Justice Ginsburg firmly relies in Gonzales 70 ) agrees, opin-
ing that abortion restrictions grounded upon protecting women
from abortion's claimed harmful consequences are unconstitu-
tional and paternalistic attempts to enforce "sex stereotypes."' 7 '
This article is interested in this debate only insofar as it con-
cerns the possible relationship between abortion and the well-be-
ing of the family. It does not take the position that legislators
should enact abortion restrictions in order to protect women from
themselves or to ensure that women's social role is limited to ma-
ternity. Women have the power to avoid that role entirely or to
combine it with additional roles in most cases; to suggest other-
wise is to propose a drastically limited belief about the scope of
women's freedom. Rather, this article pursues the possibility
that, if abortion is a decision about family and has the power to
affect family relationships, then abortion law should employ the
same insights and presumptions about the family employed in
many other areas of family law. These have been understood over
time and across many areas of family law to reflect family life as it
is actually lived and to help strengthen this most critical of insti-
tutions for the good of the whole society. As described in part I,
above, the pre-Gonzales family paradigm in the areas of ARTs and
same-sex marriage allows parents and children to be more easily
167. Bellantoni, supra n. 163, at A8.
168. CNN Newsroom, "Obama's Big Money; Giuliani Speaks Out; Iran; Captives Free; A
Growing Demand for Ethanol; Eddie Robinson Dies" (CNN Apr. 4, 2007) (TV broad.) (avail-
able at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0704/04sitroom.03.html) (former Mayor of
New York City Rudy Giuliani stating in an interview with Wolf Blitzer, "[a]bortion is
wrong, abortion shouldn't happen, personally you should counsel people to that extent").
169. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1640-53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 1641 (citing Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Per-
spective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261
(1992); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955,
1002-28 (1984)).
171. Siegel, supra n. 170, at 991-92.
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separated and adults' interests to easily trump those of children.
However, sufficient evidence exists regarding how abortion may
affect a family's well-being to support the conclusions of the Gon-
zales majority that abortion law should no longer reject traditional
family law assumptions about parent-child bonding and about
children's vulnerability.
Full examination of the literature-really, the heated contro-
versy-on the question of abortion's impact upon women, includ-
ing upon their future family relations, would require a very
lengthy article indeed. And it should be noted preliminarily that
shockingly little comprehensive research has been performed in
the U.S. about the effects of abortion, considering the fact that
there is no other surgery so frequently experienced by American
women.' 7 2 This lack of empirical data is part of the reason why
the conflicting sides of the abortion debate can still "talk past" one
another on the particular subject of abortion's effects. However,
the nuanced statements of the Gonzales majority-that "some"17 3
women experience suffering of a specifically maternal nature after
abortion, concerning the fate of a vulnerable child-have suffi-
cient bases in fact to warrant some action in response to them.
The first evidence to consult about abortion's aftermath is
that employed by the Gonzales Court's majority opinion. The
Court first cited Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's plurality opinion
in Casey, which stated as self-evident the conclusion that abortion
is a "difficult and painful moral decision" with implications for the
entire family and for society.' 74
Next, the majority cited the post-abortion experiences of 180
women, set forth in plain, raw language in affidavits appended to
an amicus brief.175 A review of the affidavits in this brief reveals
anecdotal, but consistent, evidence of the link that these pregnant
women felt with their developing fetuses, the pain they exper-
ienced when the link was terminated, and its effects upon their
future family lives. "I had a natural desire to have my baby and to
raise her," began one woman.' 76 Many affidavits reported a rela-
172. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fbinducedabortion.html (updated Jan. 2008) (estimat-
ing there are nearly 3300 abortions each day in the U.S.).
173. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1634.
174. Id. at 1634 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1992) (plurality)).
175. Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women 22-24, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634
(2007).
176. Aff. of Sandra Cano, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B. at 4, Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007).
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tionship between an abortion and later marital difficulties: "The
deep emotional scars were a large contributing factor in my di-
vorce." 177 Another tied her abortion to her "emotionally abusive
relationship for 11 years until my divorce." 178
A high percentage of the affidavits reported effects upon later
child-rearing: "Now with a 6 year old son, I am overly protective to
a fault. His relationship with his father is damaged because of my
own fears of losing my son."1 79 Some expressed the inability to be
with children or even the need to "punish myself' by sterilization
so no more children could be conceived.' 80 Some spoke of their
horror in contemplating what abortion did to the body of their un-
born child.' 8 ' Some expressed trouble bonding with later born
children.18 2 Again and again, the affidavits related that the wo-
men suffered depression, many to the point of substance abuse or
contemplation of suicide.183
177. Aff. of Donna M. Razin, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 12, Gonzales
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007).
178. Aff. of Elizabeth Campbell, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 32, Gon-
zales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007).
179. Aff. of J.L.M., Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 14, Gonzales v. Car-
hart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007); Aff. of Becky Abell, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app.
B at 23, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) ("I was an overprotective mother. I
'overdid' everything-to compensate for what I had done."); Aff. of Elizabeth Campbell, Br.
for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 32, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007)
(affiant describing herself as an "overprotective parent to the point of smothering my chil-
dren"); Af. of Hemda Ben-Judah, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 22, Gon-
zales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) (affiant explaining "I am overly protective of my
own children").
180. Aff. of Deborah R. Paine, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 19, Gonza-
les v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) ("In my need to punish myself, I had a tubal ligation
(sterilization). So now I am childless. After killing my children, I did not deserve to be a
mother.").
181. Aft. of Dana N. Landers, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B. at 17, Gonza-
les v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) (affiant explaining she was unable to heal until she
"admitted that the abortion was murder" and "society had convinced me that he/she was
just a piece of tissue"); Aft. of N.A.M., Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B. at 54,
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) (affiant explaining "I rarely look at a child that
I don't painfully remember the brutal way that mine died").
182. Aft. of D.M., Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 47-48, Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) (afflant describing "problems bonding with my first baby
and feeling natural maternal feelings").
183. Aft. ofH.T., Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 30, Gonzales v. Carhart,
127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) (afflant describing that she "[eixperienced major clinical depression
during and after birth of oldest living child after I learned how abortions were performed
and more about fetal development"); Aff. of Marie Skurka, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180
Women app. B at 70-71, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) (affiant describing
how, eleven years after her abortion, she "was drinking heavily and taking prescription
[medication] in excess"); Aft. of Amy Susan Shatrick, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women
app. B at 71, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) (affiant describing that she suf-
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Another theme throughout the affidavits is the suffering of
the fetus's biological father. It does not figure as prominently as
the theme of maternal suffering, but does appear regularly. One
woman reported that she married the father of the aborted fetus,
but "[wie had all girls and he is plagued with the guilt of killing
his possible only son. ' 18 4 Another stated: "it almost destroyed our
marriage."18 5 Another wrote about her husband: "We are the
walking wounded.., forever .... My husband became suicidal as
I did. We will always blame each other and never be guilt free."1 8 6
Stated simply, these testimonies concern parent-child rela-
tions. They are not about decisions concerning a stranger at arm's
length to the woman or the man, or someone else's offspring.
Rather, they are decisions about one who is perceived to be both
vulnerable and in a family relationship with the woman and the
man. Are these testimonies representative of the millions of wo-
men who have had legal abortions in the decades since its legali-
zation? It is impossible to say with certainty one way or another,
and there is no definitive evidence on a national scale. To repeat
an important observation made above, the National Institute of
Health, the preeminent health research facility in the U.S., has
not attached an abortion question to any of its longitudinal stud-
ies about women's health, despite the fact that women have abor-
tions more than any other surgery.'8 7 However, one group that
counsels women post-abortion reported over 100,000 women in its
post-abortion recovery programs in 2004.188 Another such group
reports conducting 500 retreats for post-abortion women annually
fered "[u]nbelievable sadness" and "drank heavily"); Aff. of L.M.S., Br. for Sandra Cano and
180 Women app. B at 70, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) (affiant describing
"[ylears (16 at least) of repeated bouts with serious, suicidal depression"); Aff. of O.F., Br.
for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 42, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007);
Aff. of T.D., Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 44, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.
Ct. 1634 (2007) ("My twelve year old daughter has just read this form and I am wanting to
die. Right now.").
184. Aft. of Paulette C. Heller, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 36, Gonza-
les v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007).
185. Aft. of Kathleen Vaunae Hansel, Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 38,
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007) ("Resulted in depression, insomnia, night-
mares, inability to make decisions regarding our two living children. It almost destroyed
our marriage.").
186. Aft. of O.F., Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women app. B at 42, Gonzales v. Carhart,
127 S. Ct. 1634 (2007).
187. See generally National Institute for Health, Women's Health, http://www.health.
NIH.gov/search.asp/28 (accessed Feb. 22, 2008) (containing no category for "abortion" in a
review of all topics available under NIH's subject heading "Women's Health").
188. Br. for Sandra Cano and 180 Women 25, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1634
(2007).
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in order to discuss the difficult aftermath of their abortions.' 8 9
This evidence seems to affirm the Gonzales majority's acknowl-
edgment that "some" women experience loss and sadness after
abortion.
In addition to the material relied upon by the Gonzales major-
ity, helpful information about possible effects of abortion comes
from international studies from countries with less controversial
political environments concerning abortion. This research is par-
ticularly helpful when it is not based only on women who self-
identify as "post-abortion," because reliable evidence suggests
that many post-aborted women will deny their abortions19 0-itself
a possible indicator of distress. Rather, the most informative re-
search includes all women receiving medical care from a central-
ized national health care system.
In a register linkage study in Finland, for example, research-
ers reviewed state records of women's lifetime medical histories
and found that, in the year following an abortion, post-aborted wo-
men had a rate of suicide six times greater than women who gave
birth.191 The researchers drew two possible conclusions: either
abortion harms mental health, or there are common risk factors
for abortion and suicide. 192 A later Welsh study concluded that
the former explanation is more likely.193 It reviewed women's
medical records pre- and post-abortion and found no increased
risk of suicide before abortion among the women who had abor-
tions. 194 But it also found the rate of suicide among women after
having induced abortions was twice the rate of women giving
birth.195
Quite recently, Finnish researchers performed a follow-up
register linkage study and concluded that post-aborted women
face a two and one-half times greater risk of suicide, accidental
189. Emily Bazelon, Is There a Post-Abortion Syndrome? N.Y. Times 641 (Jan. 21, 2007).
190. See e.g. Elise F. Jones & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Underreporting of Abortion in
Surveys of U.S. Women: 1976 to 1988, 29 Demography 113-26 (1992); Frank L. Mott et al.,
Fertility Related Data in the 1982 National Longitudinal Surveys of Work and Experience of
Youth (Columbus: Ctr. for Hum. Res. Research at Ohio St. U. 1983) (suggesting that based
on national abortion rates, approximately 60% of women having abortions conceal their
abortions from researchers with the National Longitudinal Study of Youth).
191. Mika Gissler, et al., Suicides after Pregnancy in Finland, 1987-94: Register Linkage
Study, British Med. J. 1431-34 (1996).
192. Id.
193. Christopher Morgan et al., Suicides after Pregnancy: Mental Health May Deterio-
rate as a Direct Effect of Induced Abortion, 314 British Med. J. 903 (1997).
194. Id.
195. Id.
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death, or homicide in the following year than do women who gave
birth. 196 Most recently, several New Zealand researchers, led by a
self-described "pro-choice atheist,"197 published a widely-noted
study in the Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry finding
that it is "difficult to disregard the real possibility that abortion
amongst young women is associated with increased risks of
mental health problems."198 This study's robust criticism of the
American Psychological Association's continued position claiming
a "low" risk of psychological harm' 99 has led the APA to convene a
task force on "Mental Health and Abortion" to consider new evi-
dence on post-abortion effects for a report due in 2008.200
In sum, there is credible research showing that women suffer
after abortion. While the research is not focused solely upon abor-
tion's effects on the family, it is reasonable to believe that some of
the general effects cited, such as depression or suicidal ideation,
translate to family relationship difficulties.
Of course, other studies have concluded that many, or even
most, women do not suffer mental or family problems after abor-
tion. Some of these studies are accused of exhibiting serious re-
search methodology flaws, 20 ' although so are some of the studies
claiming post-abortion distress. 20 2 In this situation, a reasonable
course of action for any side of the abortion debate claiming inter-
est in the cause of women would be to first pursue a study at the
highest possible level, specifically avoiding prior noted methodol-
ogy flaws. Such avoidance likely means directing the NIH to add
abortion questions to one or more of their long-term studies about
women's health. In particular, the study must ensure that it does
196. Mika Gissler et al., Injury, Death, Suicides and Homicides Associated with Preg-
nancy, Finland 1987-2000, 15 European J. Pub. Health 459-63 (2005).
197. Warren Throckmorton, Abortion and Mental Health, Wash. Times A13 (Jan. 21,
2006) (quoting Mr. Throckmorton as saying, "I'm immune from that charge [of having a
pro-life agenda] because I'm pro-choice"); see also Elliott Institute, "Evidence Doesn't Mat-
ter" in APA Abortion Advocacy, LifeSiteNews.com, http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2006/fed/060
216A.html (Feb. 15, 2006).
198. David M. Fergusson et al., Abortion in Young Women and Subsequent Mental
Health, 47 J. of Child Psychol. & Psych. 16, 23 (2006).
199. Id. at 23.
200. See Warren Throckmorton, Abortion and Psychology, Wash. Times A17 (May 18,
2007).
201. See e.g. David C. Reardon, A Study of Deception: Feminist Researcher "Proves"
Abortion Increases Self Esteem, 3(4) The Post-Abortion Review, http://www.afterabortion.
info/PAR/V3/n4/RUSSO.htm (1995).
202. See e.g. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1648 n. 7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting that the two studies she cites to support claims of post-abortion distress
are flawed).
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not suffer from women's underreporting of their abortions, from
self-selected cohorts, or from an inability to distinguish women
with pre-abortion mental health histories from those without.
Second, existing studies employing credible methods deserve
consideration. This category includes the European registry stud-
ies that by nature do not underreport the class of women having
abortions and that have the capacity to determine if a woman
seeking an abortion had a pre-abortion history of mental health
difficulties.
Third, other relevant literature and common sense must play
a role. The literature on miscarriage indicates, for example, that
emotional suffering regularly follows miscarriages and, in turn,
affects women's future family relationships. 20 3 It is unreasonable
to conclude that women deliberately aborting or being pressured
to abort their offspring would automatically escape similar suffer-
ing entirely. Based on current research regarding pregnancy loss
generally, and post-abortion reactions particularly, it appears
more reasonable to surmise that abortion can have real and dele-
terious effects upon family relationships.
But what about Justice Ginsburg's Gonzales dissent, which
asserted emphatically that abortion does not lead to worse effects
for women than childbirth?20 4 Justice Ginsburg spoke as if her
sources definitively put the argument to rest.20 5 Yet upon closer
inspection, her sources cannot bear that weight for four reasons.
Before examining these individually, however, it should be noted
that Justice Ginsburg began by erroneously claiming that the ma-
jority opinion asserted that all post-aborted women suffer re-
gret. 20 6 In fact, the majority spoke only of "some" women.20 7
203. See e.g. Susan O'Doherty et al., About What Was Lost: 20 Writers on Miscarriage,
Healing and Hope (Jessica Berger Gross ed., Plume 2007); Kristen M. Swanson et al., Con-
texts and Evolution of Women's Responses to Miscarriage during the First Year after Loss,
30 Research in Nursing & Health 2 (2007); Elizabeth H. Lamb, The Impact of Previous
Perinatal Loss on Subsequent Pregnancy and Parenting, 11 J. Perinatal Educ. 33 (2002);
Eirini Tsartsra & Martin P. Johnson, The Impact of Miscarriage on Women's Pregnancy-
Specific Anxiety and Feelings of Prenatal Maternal-Fetal Attachment during the Course of a
Subsequent Pregnancy: An Exploratory Follow-up Study, 27 J. of Psychosomatic Obstetrics
& Gynecology 173 (2006); Annette Kerstin et al., Ltr. to the Ed., Psychological Stress Re-
sponse after Miscarriage and Induced Abortion, 66 Psychosomatic Med. 795 (2004).
204. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id. ("The Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no
reliable evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices and conse-
quently suffer from '[slevere depression and loss of esteem.' ").
207. Id. at 1634.
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The first flaw in Justice Ginsburg's dissent is that she called
abortion a "painfully difficult decision,"20 but asked the reader to
assume that such decisions have no painful or difficult conse-
quences, even for "some" women. 20 9 Second, her most important
source (whose verbatim conclusion about abortion's effects she
adopted as her own) was the leading pro-choice research organiza-
tion in the U.S., the Alan Guttmacher Institute. 210 She next cited
a New York Times story that failed to report any of the recent or
leading European or New Zealand studies previously discussed. 211
Justice Ginsburg's remaining citations relied heavily upon the
APA and former leaders and representatives of the APA, Dr.
Nadia Stotland and Dr. Nancy Russo. 212 Yet in a very recent in-
terview regarding the above-described New Zealand findings, Dr.
Russo acknowledged that "mental health effects [of abortion] are
not relevant to the legal context of arguments to restrict access to
abortion."213 The APA currently views abortion as a "civil
right[s]" issue. 214 In other words, Justice Ginsburg's heavy reli-
ance on the APA for medical conclusions about abortion's effects
was misplaced.
Third, Justice Ginsburg made no reference whatsoever to the
more recent and most widely respected European and New Zea-
land studies finding increased risks for some women post-abor-
tion. 215
Fourth, Justice Ginsburg did not mention, let alone credit, the
testimony of the post-aborted women who addressed the Gonzales
208. Id. at 1648 n. 7.
209. Id. at 1634.
210. Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Mental Health: Myths and Realities, 9 Guttmacher
Policy Rev. 8 (2006); see Guttmacher Institute, The History of the Guttmacher Institute,
http://www.guttmacher.orglabout/history.html (accessed May 30, 2008). The Alan
Guttmacher Institute describes itself as originally a "semiautonomous division" of the na-
tion's largest abortion provider, the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. Id. Al-
though today it claims to be an "independent" corporation, it publishes material favoring
Planned Parenthood's policies in favor of legal abortion. Id.
211. See generally Bazelon, supra n. 189.
212. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1648 n. 7 (citing and quoting Am. Psychol. Assn., APA Brief-
ing Paper on the Impact of Abortion, http://www.apa.org/ppo/issues/womenabortfacts.html
(accessed May 30, 2008); Sarah Schmiege & Nancy Felipe Russo, Depression and Un-
wanted First Pregnancy: Longitudinal Cohort Study, 331 British Med. J. 1303 (2005);
Nadia L. Stotland, The Myth of Abortion Trauma Syndrome, 268 JAMA 2078, 2079 (1992);
Am. Psychol. Assn., Council Policy Manual: N. Public Interest, pt. 1, § 1(3) (1989) (available
at http://www.apa.org/about/division/cpmpubint.html) (accessed May 30, 2008).
213. Throckmorton, supra n. 197, at A13 (quoting Nancy Felipe Russo, referred by the
APA to answer the reporter's questions about the New Zealand study).
214. Id.
215. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1640-53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Court via an amicus brief.216 It was an odd and even hypocritical
gesture in a dissenting opinion that otherwise vocally supported
the intelligence and autonomy of women to ignore the women's
testimony in favor of male abortion doctors' claims regarding the
medical necessity of intact D & E abortions.
Together, the medical research and the public claims of post-
aborted women show that a significant number of women experi-
ence distress, often related to future family relations, as a result of
abortion. It is not clear that the sources cited by Justice Ginsburg
could easily trump such evidence. In fact, even Justices Gins-
burg's and O'Connor's abortion opinions have regularly suggested
that there is something inherently difficult and troubling for a wo-
man, and possibly her whole family, about a decision in favor of
abortion. These difficulties could arise, it seems, only if the wo-
man or her family perceive abortion as a severance of a type of
parent-child relation or the harming of a relatively vulnerable
creature.
In making abortion law, ordinary family law presumptions
about women's relations with their offspring must be consulted.
More research in this area could clarify what is now known about
the effects of abortion on women and families. But at this point,
one cannot dismiss the possibility that a woman's decision to have
an abortion may affect family relationships in the future, includ-
ing the well-being of future children.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Gonzales Court has moved in the direction of bringing
abortion law and the rest of family law into greater harmony, and
it might be wise for future abortion laws and policies to do the
same. Not only does abortion law have its origins in family law,
but there exists a real possibility that abortion decisions are ex-
perienced by women, and perhaps other family members, as par-
ent-child relationship decisions about vulnerable children.
Where might such a move lead? Would it create a new pater-
nalism on the part of the State and lead to sex-stereotyping of wo-
men, as Justice Ginsburg and some commentators fear? The an-
swer is no. Rather, if abortion law were to adopt typical family
law presumptions, several benefits could follow: first, better inves-
tigation into the family-related health outcomes of abortion and
therefore better-informed consent for women; second, increased
216. Id.
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restriction on later-term abortions; third, improved prevention of
unwanted pregnancies; and fourth, greater willingness to harmo-
nize parenting, employment, and other social roles for women.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that none of the suggested
outcomes can come to pass without the support of a democratic
majority willing to enact them, given that abortion laws come
from legislatures. It should not be feared that a minority could
"impose" such laws on an unwilling majority. It should also be
noted that none of these outcomes necessitate "re-sex-stereotyp-
ing" of women. In fact, as will be further discussed below, it is
possibly the failure to acknowledge self-evident facts about par-
ents' bonds with their children, and children's needs, that has pre-
vented greater legal and other progress for women.
A final preliminary observation concerns the difference be-
tween employing observations about parents and their pre-natal
offspring in making laws limiting abortion, versus employing
them solely in the service of providing more information to women
considering abortion. Pro-choice advocates strenuously insist that
the latter is the only position authentically assisting women. But
if women experience abortion as a kind of parent-child decision-
and there is substantial evidence that they do-then the law's typ-
ical stance toward these types of decisions is not a wholly inappli-
cable or inappropriate model. Family law presumes that parents
ordinarily wish to preserve a relationship with their biological
children and that children sometimes require special protection.
That this model may result in some limiting of a very broadly de-
fined abortion right is not by itself a conversation-stopper. No
member of the parent-child dyad has unlimited legal rights in any
other family context outside abortion. Gonzales, by introducing
this trait of family law into abortion law, is simply bringing abor-
tion law back to its roots, while harmonizing it with a more realis-
tic assessment of women's and others' actual experiences of abor-
tion.
Turning to possible outcomes of allowing abortion law to con-
sider parents' bonds with their children and children's relative
weakness, a first outcome might include the pursuit of high-level
research about the effects of abortion on women, on family well-
being, and on children. The notable dearth of such important re-
search has been mentioned several times. This research might in-
clude, for example, studies about the nature of the ties, if any, wo-
men feel toward the fetal life they carry, whether their pregnancy
is "wanted" or "unwanted," "expected" or "unexpected." It might
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also identify and measure the effects of abortion upon women's
later family choices and relationships. It could study abortion's
effects, if any, on later-born children and on men. The fetal expe-
rience of various types of abortions might also be explored. The
results of this sort of research would provide better counseling and
informed consent for women seeking abortions.
A second possible outcome of taking parent-child bonds and
children's vulnerability more seriously in the abortion context
might be the restriction of particularly gruesome or painful types
of abortions. Such laws would aim either to protect fetal life from
pain or to avoid disrupting more developed parent-child type
bonds, or both. They might take several forms: fetal anesthesia
requirements; bans on certain abortion methods; or bans on later-
term abortions.
A third possible outcome might involve better efforts to avoid
unwanted pregnancies. The complete debate over how best to ac-
complish this is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is
noteworthy that simply dispensing more contraception from pub-
lic and private sources over the past nearly four decades has not
answered the problem of high rates of out-of-wedlock births or
abortions in the U.S. Nor has a stepped-up focus on abstinence
programs in recent years. The full answer must be more complex;
it must look beyond the moment that a woman or a couple decide
to have sexual relations. It must also address the many reasons
why so many men and women fail to respect or acknowledge the
procreative aspect of sexual relationships, women's unique gifts
and burdens in connection with pregnancy, childbirth and child
rearing, and children's needs for sufficient resources and a secure
and stable upbringing.
Thinking more broadly, a fourth possible outcome involves
further action to harmonize childbearing with a wide variety of
social freedoms for women. Of course, this would involve the goal
just described above: preventing pregnancies in situations giving
rise to tremendous conflicts between caring properly for children
and women achieving sufficient education or income. Single-par-
ent pregnancies, for example, may often lead to such challenging
situations. It would also involve, however, a mixture of state law
and both public and private policies improving the availability
and flexibility of employment and education for women to a degree
not yet accomplished.
This last possible outcome specifically addresses the fears of
pro-choice leaders and scholars that acknowledging parent-child
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bonds and children's needs can only result in the sex-stereotyping
of women. Certainly, the Gonzales Court's acknowledgment of
only a mother-child bond217 helps give rise to this concern. That
is, the Court spoke as if fathers have no similar feelings for their
offspring and, more ominously, as if they bear no responsibility
respecting either abortion or childbirth. While the Court likely
addressed only the mother's bond because she is legally alone in
the abortion context-the father having no legally recognized veto
power-the Court should have at least acknowledged that both bi-
ological parents have feelings and responsibilities toward their
offspring.
Either way, denying the self-evident connection mothers feel
to their children will not further women's progress. Rather,
achieving progress and freedom for both women and men requires
helping them to meet both their personal obligations as well as
their obligations to their employers and wider society. Denying
that women are drawn to their unborn children, as well as to
spending considerable time and effort rearing born children, only
results in policies reinforcing an outdated and largely male model
of social life and employment 21-8-a model in which no institution
need "flex" or change to allow women and men to meet children's
needs. On the other hand, recognizing that both men and women
feel keen obligations to their children at the same time that they
have work or school obligations to meet is both more realistic and
a more likely premise for a successful argument in favor of family-
friendly work and education policies. This is true even if, as past
decades have shown, women are more likely than men to take ad-
vantage of these policies by, for example, working flexible or part-
time hours.
Denying that women feel a deep bond with their children, or
that women perceive and respond to children's natural vulnerabil-
ity, does not reflect the reality of women's lives. Nor does it seem
the most persuasive path toward demanding, and achieving, effec-
tive accommodation for the educational and employment aspira-
tions women hold. In fact, it seems to constitute a claim that wo-
men's childbearing abilities and maternal responses are inherent
disabilities. This argument is not only flawed but sexist in the
217. Id. at 1634.
218. See generally Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict
and What to Do about It (Oxford U. Press 2000) (arguing that modern employment laws
and policies are largely based upon the model of an ideal male worker, unencumbered by
childcare interests or responsibilities).
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most fundamental sense. It is no premise for a true or effective
feminism. However, if future abortion jurisprudence follows the
path down which Gonzales started, laws and policies concerning
unborn children could begin to reflect the deep bond that women
and men feel toward both their unborn and born children, paving
the way for social and economic institutions to follow suit.
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